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Peacetime Engagement:
Beating Swords into Plowshares?

A Monograph
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ABSTRACT

The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union ended forty-five years of containment policy for the United States. For the duration of the Cold War the U.S. security strategy was to deter communism everywhere it threatened to break out. The United States spared no expense to deter Soviet expansion from the Congo to West Germany, from the Dominican Republic to South Vietnam, and from Grenada to Panama. Wherever communism threatened to gain ground the United States was willing to move in to contain the expansion. In the post-Cold War era the need to deter Soviet expansion has disappeared. In seeking a new defense policy that takes into account the diminished Soviet threat, President Bush has delineated a three component policy. A key element in accomplishing the objectives of the new policy is termed "peacetime engagement."

The physical security of the nation should and will always remain the most important concern for the Army and any mission the Army is given should be thought of in terms of the security of the nation, but the question now is: what role, if any, does the Army have in countering threats to our national security when combat is not involved?

This monograph attempts to answer this question by first examining the current doctrine on peacetime engagement. Next the monograph delineates the Army's capabilities for peacetime engagement using the Battlefield Operating Systems. The monograph then discusses the history of the Army in peacetime engagement activities using the American frontier, reconstruction in Germany after World War II, humanitarian aid to the Kurds after Operation Desert Storm, and humanitarian aid to the Haitian refugees in Cuba. Finally the monograph defines a proper role for the Army within peacetime engagement activities using seven criteria. The monograph concludes that there is a proper role for the Army in peacetime engagement, however, the seven criteria must be met to keep the Army focused on its primary warfighting mission.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.....	1
PURPOSE OF PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT.....	2
PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT ACTIVITIES.....	5
U.S. ARMY CAPABILITIES IN PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT.....	9
PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT HISTORY.....	13
AMERICA--OPENING UP THE WEST.....	14
GERMANY--RECONSTRUCTION AFTER WORLD WAR II.....	18
NORTHERN IRAQ--HUMANITARIAN AID TO THE KURDS.....	23
CUBA--RESETTLING HAITIAN REFUGEES.....	25
DEFINING A PROPER ROLE.....	27
IMPLICATIONS.....	34
CONCLUSION.....	37
ENDNOTES.....	42
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	45

PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT

BEATING SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES?

Peacetime Engagement

The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union ended forty-five years of containment policy for the United States. For the duration of the Cold War the U.S. security strategy was to deter communism everywhere it threatened to break out. The United States spared no expense to deter Soviet expansion from the Congo to West Germany, from the Dominican Republic to South Vietnam, and from Grenada to Panama. Wherever communism threatened to gain ground the United States was willing to move in to contain the expansion. In the post-Cold War era the need to deter Soviet expansion has disappeared. In seeking a new defense policy that takes into account the diminished Soviet threat, President Bush has delineated a three component policy. A key element in accomplishing the objectives of the new policy is termed "peacetime engagement."

President Bush described his vision for peacetime engagement in a speech to the Aspen Institute in August of 1990 when he said, "What we require now is a defense policy that adapts to the significant changes we are witnessing--without neglecting the enduring realities that will continue to shape our security strategy. A policy of peacetime engagement every bit as constant and committed to the defense of our interests and ideals in today's world as in the time of conflict and Cold War." ¹

The defense of our interests and ideals, our national security, is built on three pillars: the physical security of the nation, the economic security of the nation, and the maintenance of an educated polity capable of understanding and willing to support and defend America's values and objectives. The defense of our goals and objectives in today's world is different from the Cold War world in that the direct physical threat to the nation has diminished, while the threat to our

economy and our values has increased in relative importance. The physical security of the nation should and will always remain the most important concern for the Army and any mission the Army is given should be thought of in terms of the security of the nation, but the question now is: what role, if any, does the Army have in countering threats to our national security when combat is not involved?

Purpose of Peacetime Engagement

Many defense publications have used "peacetime engagement" or a similar term since the President coined it in August of 1990. There is, however, no consensus on precisely what peacetime engagement is. Each document uses the term with slightly different variations in its meaning. In order to form some consensus on peacetime engagement, it may be possible to find similarities in the usage of the term, and from the similarities define its purpose. A delineation of the purpose of peacetime engagement should help to determine a proper role, if any, for the U.S. Army.

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict) defines the purpose of peacetime engagement as taking advantage of opportunities for promoting American principles, and preventing the gradual erosion of American security in an increasingly disorderly and complex world.²

The U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command, in an exploratory draft concept statement, defined the purpose of peacetime engagement as "achieving national security objectives through the coordinated application of political, economic, informational, and military means spanning all states of the operational continuum short-of-war in order to promote stability, counter violence worldwide and multiply national elements of power and influence."³

The Honorable Michael P.W. Stone (Secretary of the Army) and General Gordon R. Sullivan (Chief of Staff of the Army) in A Statement on the Posture of The United States Army Fiscal Year 1993 state that "peacetime engagement represents a predominantly nonhostile state...characterized by the benign use of military forces along with political, economic, and informational measures to achieve national objectives and to complement our efforts to deter conflict or, should deterrence fail, win in combat. Operations in support of peacetime engagement are normally interagency in character and are designed to address the fundamental causes of instability that can lead to regional conflict."⁴

Joint Publication 0-1, Basic National Defense Doctrine, does not directly address peacetime engagement, but does discuss peace as "that concord and amity among mankind which nations require to promote human rights and welfare."⁵

Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations, does not use the term *peacetime engagement*, but uses the term *peacetime competition* to describe the same activities as those of peacetime engagement. JPUB 3-0 states the purpose of peacetime competition is to "use political, economic, psychological, and military measures, short of combat operations or active support of warring parties, to achieve national objectives."⁶

There are four common themes that run through the explanations of peacetime engagement: support or achieve national objectives, build influence, enhance stability, and promote American principles/human rights. Combining the similarities in each of the definitions presents the following purpose for peacetime engagement: to achieve U.S. national objectives by building influence, enhancing stability, and promoting American principles. To accomplish this aim, U.S. assets must address the root causes of internal and external conflicts, help nations develop the capabilities, institutions, and infrastructure necessary to

implement reform, promote diplomatic solutions to regional conflicts, and defuse crises.

With the diminishing threat to the physical survival of the nation, the risks to other aspects of security, such as economic, are the most likely dangers the U.S. will need to address. Peacetime engagement is one of the ways to address these threats. The national security objectives most likely to be influenced or achieved by peacetime engagement are: ensuring access to foreign markets, energy, mineral resources, the oceans, and space; promote an open and expanding international economic system based on market principles; strengthen and enlarge the commonwealth of free nations that share a commitment to democracy and individual rights; maintain stable regional military balances to deter those powers that might seek regional dominance; promote diplomatic solutions to regional disputes; and support aid, trade and investment policies that promote economic development as well as social and political progress.⁷ Every aspect of national power may not be needed in every area of the world, therefore a plan must be made with at least consideration given to each aspect of national power and the reasons for its use or non-use addressed.

The transition between national security objectives and the allocation of assets to peacetime engagement operations is one that needs close scrutiny. Threats to regional stability exist in most regions of the world, each continent presents many possible markets for the U.S., and many areas of the world contain new democracies or democratic institutions that could use U.S. influence and encouragement. Unfortunately, while peacetime engagement operations are not necessarily force intensive, there are insufficient forces available to perform peacetime engagement activities for all areas that need them. Further, as former President Richard Nixon stated in his book, Seize the Moment, "U.S. power has limits...we cannot do everything....The U.S. must identify vital interests"⁸ and

commit power to deter threats to those interests. Forces to conduct peacetime engagement operations are part of the power the U.S. has to commit to the defense of its interests.

Increasingly, the biggest external threat to U.S. interests abroad is economic. Access to markets is an interest of the U.S.⁹ Regional instability is a threat to this interest, but only in areas where the U.S. wants markets or areas that control access to or from those markets, such as the Suez or Panama Canals. The U.S. needs to clearly identify those areas now and commit national power within a coordinated plan to actively open or keep open those markets. An element of national power readily available and very enticing for use in cases of regional instability is the military element. The Army component of the military element needs to be prepared to deploy when told but, just as importantly, the Army needs to be prepared to offer decision makers options on forces to deploy. The Army also needs a clearly defined rationale for when, and if, Army forces would be appropriate for employment. This rationale is helpful for at least two reasons: as an aid to planning and as a guide to the advice the Army will give civilian decision makers when Army employment is considered.

To determine which peacetime engagement activities, if any, are proper for the U.S. Army, it is necessary to know what activities comprise peacetime engagement.

Peacetime Engagement Activities

The number of activities involved in peacetime engagement is extremely large. Many departments of the government are involved in some sort of peacetime engagement activity somewhere in the world. The activities range from training military units in counterinsurgency techniques, to providing disaster relief to earthquake victims, to replanting forests. The agencies

represented are numerous and range from the Department of Defense, to the Department of Transportation, to the Department of Agriculture. To list every peacetime engagement activity would be counterproductive, but a list of categories of peacetime engagement activities demonstrates the kinds of roles the Army could accomplish in the peacetime engagement arena.

Peacetime engagement activities fit into six broad categories: nation assistance, security assistance, support to U.S. civil authority, peacekeeping, antiterrorism, and counter-drug operations. In each of these broad categories there are a variety of operations that the Army could perform, either as the lead agency (rare as that may be) or as a supporting agency.

Nation assistance includes, but is not limited to, the subcategories of: humanitarian aid, security assistance, disaster relief, and support to U.S. civil authorities. Nation assistance is any operation that promotes regional stability and U.S. influence by assisting the internal development of nations. The goal of nation assistance is to provide the friendly nation with the ability for self-development. To accomplish this goal, the United States will sometimes need to employ forces to do the work on projects, but in most instances the most effective way to accomplish the goal is to transfer the necessary skills to host nation personnel and teach them to do the work.

Nation assistance is initiated at the request of the host nation and the U.S. ambassador to the nation. If military forces are used in the nation assistance program, their use is approved at the appropriate level and the regional Commander in Chief (CINC) monitors the program.

Nation assistance programs normally occur as either routine ongoing operations or as emergency measures on a short term basis. The ongoing routine operations are characterized by deliberate planning with long-term commitment to well defined goals and objectives. They are normally involved in improving a

nation's infrastructure by either building fixed assets or real estate or by developing systems and procedures for government. Emergency measures are characterized by unforeseen occurrences that require rapid response, but short-term commitment. They are normally to repair damaged or destroyed infrastructure or reduce human suffering. These are operations that usually follow some man-made or natural disaster.

Security assistance consists of the groups of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (amended), the Arms Export Act of 1976 (amended) and other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense related services by grant, loan, credit or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. A predominant interface of the U.S. Army with host nations occurs through the Security Assistance Training Program (SATP). This program has two primary subcomponents--the International Military Education and Training Program (IMETP) and the Foreign Military Sales Program (FMSP).¹⁰

Support to U.S. civil authority is regulated by Title 10, U.S. Code, Sections 371-378, AR 500-51, Support to Civilian Law Enforcement, and by Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 1385 (Posse Comitatus), among others. The U.S. Army may be called upon to provide support to civil authority for disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, counter-drug operations, counterterrorism, and civil disturbances. These are normally interagency operations with the Army usually subordinate to a department other than the DOD. For example, the DOD has standing memorandums of understanding with the Departments of Agriculture and the Interior, and the American National Red Cross concerning disaster relief.¹¹

Peacekeeping operations are military operations conducted with the consent of the belligerent parties to a conflict to maintain a negotiated truce and to facilitate a diplomatic resolution.¹² The goal of peacekeeping is to prevent

deteriorating circumstances from progressing to war or to prevent hostilities from breaking out again. The outcome of the peacekeeping mission is to provide the belligerent factions with diplomatic solutions to their differences, thus promoting the conditions to further promote stability and gain influence.

Nation assistance operations can occur during a peacekeeping mission. Ideally, peacekeeping and nation assistance should occur simultaneously as the peacekeeping operation keeps belligerents separated and nation assistance develops solutions to the causes of conflict. The connection between the military and the political end-states is clear and needs to be planned and coordinated. The military end-state is the maintenance of the peace and separation of the belligerents. The political end-state concerns the care and treatment of displaced civilians and the resolution of the underlying causes of conflict.

Peacetime engagement also includes selected actions taken in response to terrorism. Terrorism is "the unlawful use of--or threatened use of--force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives."¹³ Actions taken to combat terrorism fall into two categories: antiterrorism and counterterrorism.

Antiterrorism includes all measures that installations, units, and individuals take to reduce the probability of falling victim to a terrorist act.¹⁴ It is an activity that is ongoing across the continuum of military operations. Counterterrorism includes the full range of offensive measures to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.¹⁵ Only antiterrorism can be considered as part of peacetime engagement operations. Counterterrorism operations occur in an environment of hostilities short of war, or war.

Counter-drug operations include all efforts taken to attack the flow of illegal drugs at the source, in transit, and during distribution. This is an

interagency and combined operation involving U.S. agencies, foreign governments and each state within the United States.

With the peacetime engagement activities categorized, a discussion of specific capabilities of the Army that can be brought to bear on the problem will be examined.

U.S. Army Capabilities in Peacetime Engagement

The seven battlefield operating systems are useful in identifying the type of capabilities extant in the Army today available or useful in peacetime engagement operations. The United States Army uses a matrix of the seven battlefield operating systems to assist in synchronizing battles. The seven systems are: intelligence and electronic warfare, maneuver, fire support, air defense artillery, mobility/counter mobility, combat service support, and command and control. For the purpose of this paper I will address maneuver, indirect fire, and air defense artillery as one category and each of the other four systems separately. An essential idea to keep in mind when reading about the capabilities of Army units is that while the Army can do the actual work on peacetime engagement projects, it is far more important to transfer that ability to the host country forces.

Intelligence and Electronic Warfare. Forces in this category provide the expertise and the equipment to accomplish many activities vital to peacetime engagement. These include: collection, monitoring, surveillance, detection, analysis, collation and dissemination of information. Even in peacetime, intelligence activities need to continue to keep commanders informed of the situation around them. This can be especially true in peacetime engagement operations where it will be up to the intelligence community to identify for the commander the background of conflict or the underlying conditions which need to

be addressed in a country. In addition to work in the host nation during a peacetime engagement operation, intelligence personnel must prepare area studies prior to deployment to prepare the deploying unit for the conditions they will encounter in the host country. In this instance civil affairs activities can be a very large and important part of the intelligence gathering function.

Intelligence gathering will include electronic as well as human means. Inherent in this process is linguistic capability, further emphasizing the importance of civil affairs in the intelligence support to the command. Intelligence forces can also provide training to host nation forces as well as gathering and analyzing intelligence for committed U.S. forces.

Maneuver, Fire Support, and Air Defense Artillery. The capability of these types of forces falls into three categories: protection, labor, and military training.

The situation within every country the U.S. will conduct peacetime engagement activities will not be benign. Some factions within a country may have agendas that are damaged by the operations of U.S. forces. In cases like these the forces performing the peacetime engagement activities may need protection. In most instances the U.S. would rely on the host nation to provide the requisite protection, however, this may not always be possible. As a result, forces in this category can be committed to protect other units involved in peacetime engagement. The force providing the protection would not be in the primary role, they would be there only to facilitate the operations of the force directly involved in peacetime engagement.

In most instances it will be preferable to use host nation personnel as the labor pool for peacetime engagement activities, thus facilitating skill transfer to them. In some instances though, such as disaster relief, there may not be sufficient host nation labor readily available. When this occurs, U.S. forces in

this category also present a potential labor force for operations that will require a large number of "hands" to accomplish. For instance, flood or famine relief operations in austere areas require a great deal of manual labor.

Typically, maneuver forces are thought of only in terms of infantry, armor, or other similar branches. Peacetime engagement requires the central efforts of other units not normally thought of as maneuver forces in conventional operations, including combat service support units or the military police and engineer corps. In some peacetime engagement operations, such as restoring order after a natural disaster, these forces may be the largest or only forces sent to the host nation. Traditional maneuver forces may be called upon to support CSS or other assets as they perform the primary functions of peacetime engagement.

Forces in this category can accomplish their own unit training as part of peacetime engagement with the military forces of the host nation, thus providing further skill transfer. Additionally, association between the forces of the U.S. and other nations fosters the transfer of professionalism and facilitates understanding and interoperability for future operations involving the nations.

Mobility/Counter mobility. Forces in this category can provide vertical and horizontal construction for infrastructure development as well as geographic survey, and mapping support. The operations of these forces range from digging wells for villages to building power plants for larger cities. From building or improving roads to building airfields. The priority must be to transfer the skills to host nation personnel. In the case of infrastructure development it is especially important to transfer at least the ability to maintain and repair the work done by the engineers. If this skill is not transferred, U.S. Army units may have to continue to deploy just to maintain work already performed. This would make the peacetime engagement operations self-limiting. It is also important to

remember, in skill transfer, to give the host nation a sense of ownership and pride in the project. A project constructed in the host nation should be that country's project, not a project that the Americans construct and maintain.

Combat Service Support. This category contains the most diverse assortment of forces, making it the category with the broadest potential application for peacetime engagement operations. This category of forces includes: dental, medical, and veterinary services, ground transportation as well as coastal and inland waterway transportation, airport and seaport terminal operators, fuel and petroleum handlers, linguistic support and area study programs, sanitation expertise, and logistical support. Additionally, the Army has lawyers, JAG, and civil affairs personnel with training in government operations, as well as chaplains and counseling personnel. The skills contained within this category are nearly limitless. Almost every function necessary to efficiently and effectively run a country is extant in some form in the Army.

Command and Control. Forces in this category come with the communications networks and equipment to help control operations. It also includes commanders, staffs, and procedures to plan, prepare, organize, and execute operations.

This command and control function is a key reason that commitment of Army forces to peacetime engagement is so attractive. The commanders and staffs routinely organize diverse organizations to accomplish specific objectives. This aspect is very applicable to peacetime engagement operations that involve personnel from not only different military services, but also different departments within our own government as well as other governments. The staffs bring with them a practiced routine of decision making processes and orders or instruction passing procedures. These procedures allow the staff to

quickly assess the work to be done, determine the best organization to do it, and pass that information and direction on to the appropriate people.

A command and control ability normally overlooked in the Army but possibly very useful in peacetime engagement operations is the skill and experience of a garrison staff. The garrison staff has experience in running a small city in the form of Army posts and has vast knowledge in how to effectively trouble-shoot many of the problems involved in managing the activities of everyday life in a city. The Army should not overlook or disregard out of hand this resource when planning peacetime engagement operations.

With the capabilities of the Army identified, it is instructive to see how the Army has used its capabilities in the past to conduct similar operations to peacetime engagement.

Peacetime Engagement History

Historically, the Army has been involved in peacetime engagement type activities from the beginning of our nation up to the present. It not only possesses the resources to assist in peacetime engagement, it has a rich heritage in performing this role. This monograph will discuss four historical examples of the Army's involvement in peacetime engagement activities:

America--opening up the country

Germany--reconstruction after World War II

Northern Iraq--humanitarian aid to the Kurds

Cuba--resettling Haitian refugees

In each of the examples elements of peacetime engagement activities appear. During the times between wars the major mission of the Army is to stay prepared to fight the next war, however during all interwar years the Army has spent time and resources conducting peacetime engagement operations.


America--Opening Up the West

In the years following the end of the Revolutionary War, a debate raged in America over the need for a standing army in times of peace. The prevailing view in America at the time was that the defense of America should rest on a "well-regulated and disciplined militia sufficiently armed and accoutered."¹⁶ George Washington, when asked his opinion, followed the prevailing view with the exception that a small regular army should be maintained to "awe the Indians, protect our trade, prevent the encroachment of our Neighbors of Canada and the Florida's, and guard us at least from surprises; also for security of our magazines."¹⁷ Washington's view eventually prevailed and a small standing army remained in service. Without wars to fight though, the daily activities of the Army soon turned to what might be considered today as nation assistance. The most interesting feature of this nation assistance is that the nation being assisted was the United States.

During the period 1783-1812 the Army executed several expeditions against the Indians in the West and South, but otherwise they were involved in nation assistance type activities. The Army garrisoned the frontier by building forts and settlements, improving or building lines of communications, surveying and mapping large areas of the country, and protecting the westward expansion of the nation. For example, in 1803 the Army became the initial government of Louisiana when President Jefferson appointed Brigadier General James Wilkinson (an Army officer) as the governor of the territory. The Army immediately garrisoned several settlements and began the improvement of lines of communications and port facilities, as well as protecting the development of the railroad. Further, it was the Army that sent out the expeditions of Lewis and Clark in 1804 to survey and map the Northwest, and the two expeditions of

Zebulon Pike, in 1805-1806 and 1806-1807, to the headwaters of the Mississippi and then to the southwest.

The War of 1812 interrupted the peacetime engagement activities of the Army for a short time. However, at the conclusion of the war, the Army once again turned towards westward expansion. The Army was ever in front of the settlers in westward expansion surveying, fortifying, and building roads. In the period between 1814-1840 the Army built a series of forts on the frontier to protect settlers, provide communications with the frontier, and provide bases from which to continue to expand the nation. The map below illustrates the frontier as defined by established forts as of 1815. The forts not only defined the edge of the frontier, they also defined the trails to the west as settlers moved along the routes from fort to fort for protection and resupply purposes.



The Western Frontier Defined By Forts Built 1815-1845


While peacetime engagement activities were considered by the Army of the 1820-1830's as secondary to its Indian fighting duties, by 1840 the emphasis shifted primarily to helping the nation expand. This emphasis translated to expeditions by the Army to explore and chart the west. The expedition in 1842 by Lt. John C. Fremont of the Corps of Topographical Engineers to explore and map the Platte River was mostly for the benefit of settlers moving on the Oregon Trail. A second expedition by Fremont in 1843 explored and mapped all the way to Sacramento, California.

In 1846 war once again interrupted the nation building activities of the Army in the West. The Mexican War lasted two years and with America's victory the Army once more returned to peacetime engagement activities. The first activity in the post Mexican War period was the exploration of the new southern frontier of the U.S. The most important explorations were conducted to find routes for transcontinental railroads. In conjunction with this exploration the Army built forts, settlements, and roads and conducted mapping. Although Indians were still a problem in the decade of the 1850's, nation building remained the primary task of the Army in the West.

The end of the Civil War in 1865 gave the Army another opportunity to perform in a nation building role. Sherman's Army in the South found itself the government in being in most areas and greatly contributed to the reconstruction effort. Soldiers found themselves performing nontraditional soldier duties. With the fighting mostly over, soldiers' duties ranged from police work to repair of sanitation systems.

In 1867, with the purchase of Alaska, the Army again found itself on the edge of civilization building forts, settlements, roads, and railroads. The Army's role in Alaska lasted until 1877 when the Treasury Department assumed the primary responsibility.

In the period commonly known as the The Indian Wars, 1865-1890, the Army continued its nation assistance role in the West. The nation assistance operations of the Army in this period defined the frontier and three major routes to the west. The forts and routes west, as depicted on the map below, follow the same routes as today's major highways: I-90, I-70, and I-10. Most of the nation assistance work discussed above consisted of work done primarily by combat arms soldiers. The list of projects that the Corps of Engineers conducted and continues to conduct is too immense for the scope of this paper. However, the work included the construction of many public buildings such as court houses, libraries, and museums. The Corps also dug canals and improved important inland waterways such as the Mississippi River, the Cape Cod Canal, and the Intercoastal Waterway.



*The Western Frontier Defined By Forts Built 1860-1890
(Northern, Central, and Southern Routes West)*

The nation assistance and the peacekeeping roles of peacetime engagement activities occupied the Army during all of the interwar periods in U.S. history up to WWI. With the exception of the Corps of Engineers, peacetime engagement activities and civil works lost favor with the professional military establishment. Building roads and other civil works went against the "nature" of the Army and so for the most part was discontinued. This lack of emphasis led in part to a lack of training and organization for civil work prior to WW I. This lack of training and organization led to a loss of the very perishable skills involved in peacetime engagement operations and indirectly led to the poor performance of the Army in occupation duty after World War I. This connection was made in an Army report on American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918-1920. The report stated that "the American army of occupation lacked both training and organization to guide the destinies of the nearly one million civilians whom the fortunes of war had placed under its temporary sovereignty."¹⁸ This report set the stage for a series of studies conducted on military government. The studies resulted in an organization and a role in military government for the Army that greatly enhanced the occupation Army's performance after World War II.

Germany--Reconstruction after World War II

As World War II grew in size and intensity the realization that the United States would be involved became increasingly clear. With this realization came the knowledge that the U.S. would probably be involved in occupation duty at the end of the war. This led to the publication of an Army Field Manual for occupation forces. FM 27-5, Military Government, was published 30 July 1940 based on work done at the U.S. Army War College and The Hunt Report,¹⁹ with the purpose of setting out guidance for occupation forces. One of the outcomes of the publishing of this manual was the assignment of responsibility for military

government personnel, training, and planning to the Army Adjutant General. A further outcome from assigning responsibility for military government to the Adjutant General was the creation of a new duty position, Provost Marshal General, and the creation of a new branch, the Military Police Corps. Prior to 1941 the Army had never had a police corps.

As responsibility for military government was fixed and officers began to study the task in detail, it was quickly determined that the task would be far greater than the previous cursory look had anticipated. As a result, in December of 1941 the Army Adjutant General proposed that the Chief of Staff authorize military government training in a school to be operated by the Provost Marshal General. General Marshall (CoS) concurred on 6 January 1942. This school initially operated with military government as only part of its curriculum. However, by April of 1942 it was determined the military government was complex enough to warrant its own school and so on 2 April, 1942 the Secretary of War established the School of Military Government at the University of Virginia. Brigadier General Cornelius W. Wickersham was assigned as the first commandant and director.²⁰

At Casablanca in January 1943 President Roosevelt announced that the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers was the goal of the allies. With this announcement the probability of occupation became a certainty. Fortunately for the allies, planning for occupation duty in Europe had been ongoing for at least a year. In the summer of 1942 the European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (ETOUSA) established the American School Center at Shrivenham, England. In December 1943 the Civil Affairs Center was activated in Shrivenham to train civil affairs detachments for military government duties in Europe.

The first duty of the Civil Affairs Center during inprocessing of officers was to assign personnel to detachments. The center developed four types of

detachments for duty in Europe: A (17 officers, 2 warrant officers, and 24 enlisted men), B (9 officers, 2 warrant officers, and 16 enlisted men), C (5 officers and 9 enlisted men), and D (4 officers and 6 enlisted men).²¹ The A detachments were designed for employment in major cities, including national capitals such as Berlin and Paris, and were regarded as elite detachments. The others would be stationed in smaller cities or rural communities.²²

The planning for military government duties exposed a deficiency in the structure of civil affairs units. While the detachments were responsible for civil administration in zones in Europe, they had no support structure. To correct this shortcoming ETOUSA established the European Civil Affairs Division on 7 February 1944.²³ The sole function of the division headquarters would be to act as the parent organization for the civil affairs personnel and to provide them with the support that the combat units could not spare.

The primary objective of the civil affairs detachments was "to ensure that conditions exist among the civilian population which will not interfere with operations, but will promote these operations."²⁴ The detachments were not designed to govern the zones in Europe. They were designed to assist the local government in getting reorganized and functioning again. To accomplish this the detachments were given sufficient authority and organized around the technical knowledge necessary to instruct and supervise local governments. By allowing the local governments to perform the functions of government, the detachments contributed to attaining the second SHAEF civil affairs objective of using a minimum of military manpower.

The detachments were charged with the following essential actions:

Governmental Affairs

1. Hold a conference of local officials. Announce the military government proclamations and ordinances and make the necessary plans for enforcing them.
2. Post the proclamations and ordinances, noting time and date.
3. Reconnoiter the area.
4. Make arrangements for billeting military personnel in the area.

Public Safety

1. Hold a conference of local public safety officials.
2. Secure guards for supplies, important installations, and municipal records.
3. Control circulation of the local population (especially displaced persons and refugees).
4. Impound all weapons, explosives, narcotics, and radio transmitters in civilian hands.
5. Inspect local prisons and detention camps.
6. Investigate unexploded bombs, minefields, booby-trapped areas, and ammunition dumps.

Public Health

1. Reestablish local public health organizations.
2. Secure care for civilian sick and wounded.
3. Report incidence of communicable diseases.
4. Correct serious hazards in environmental sanitation, particularly in water supply and sewage disposal systems.
5. Establish strict control over medical supplies.

Public Welfare

1. Reestablish local agencies for handling relief.
2. Provide adequate food distribution facilities.
3. Establish information and lost and found bureaus.

Utilities and Communications

1. Establish military control over all means of communications and all utilities.
2. Restore civilian services, including water, sewage, power and gas, telephone and telegraph, and postal service as well as streets and roads.

Labor, Transportation, and Salvage

1. Coordinate local labor exchanges.
2. Establish control over all means of transportation.
3. Set up a system of salvage collection.

Resources, Industry, Commerce, and Agriculture

1. Procure and provide materials and services for the military and food for civilians.
2. Restore price and rationing controls; suppress black markets; institute first aid for restoration of normal civilian requirements.

Legal

1. Set up military government courts as necessary.
2. See that proper proclamations, ordinances, regulations, and orders are posted and published.
3. Cooperate with the public safety contingent and Counterintelligence Corps on release of political prisoners.
4. Make recommendations on local legislation to be suspended.

Fiscal

1. Guard banks and other depositories of funds.
2. Require continuance of local tax collection.
3. Assure proper custody of all enemy, abandoned, or absentee-owned property.

Supply

1. Contact local government officials in charge of food and clothing supplies and find the location of storage points and available stocks.²⁵

On 8 June, 1944, two days after the invasion, two detachments landed on Omaha Beach and three days later they were both in operation in France. One in Treviere and one at Isigny, the first large towns liberated. The French, however, were prepared and capable of running their own governmental affairs, so the real work did not begin until the allies began to liberate Germany.

With the beginning of the liberation of Germany the detachments began their civil government duties in earnest. At Verviers, the First Army G-5 trained captured German policemen for work in occupation duty as policemen. ²⁶ Refugees were located, housed, fed, and relocated, after insuring they first did not interfere with operations. Bridges were rebuilt and lines of communication were improved and guarded. Sanitation and public health systems were returned to operating order.

The work of the Army in nation building continued in Germany even after the end of the occupation. With forces still stationed in Europe the work of peacetime engagement continues today. This work, begun as the final phase of war is still valid.

The Army learned a great deal in the study, planning, and execution of occupation duty during the closing years of WW II. The Army adopted new organizations and conducted special training to prepare for peacetime engagement activities. The lessons learned and the structure changes continue to facilitate peacetime engagement operations today.

The conclusion of a war is seldom a clean and neat affair. There is normally a great deal of work to be done to put a country and its people back in order after a war. To facilitate this the Army conduct post-conflict operations which require the same skills and functions as nation assistance or building. In other words, post conflict activity requires the same skills as peacetime engagement. The most recent example of post-conflict operations occurred with the Army in Northern Iraq after the end of the Operation Desert Storm.

Northern Iraq--Humanitarian Aid to the Kurds

On 20 April, 1991 U.S. Army forces composing Joint Task Force-Bravo (JTF-B), as part of a combined task force, began operations in Northern Iraq to provide humanitarian aid to displaced Kurdish civilians. The mission of the Army forces during Operation Provide Comfort was to "provide security for the combined task force and Kurdish displaced civilians, establish communities for up to 300,000 displaced civilians and provide humanitarian and civil assistance to displaced civilians in northern Iraq."²⁷

The first function of the Army was to establish the initial security zone around the town of Zakho, Iraq. During the duration of the mission the security zone would expand to an area of approximately 6,300 square kilometers. To demilitarize the area, JTF-B officials conducted negotiations with Iraqi officials.

Although the security of the zone was an ongoing function of the JTF in Iraq, the major work performed involved humanitarian aid functions. The work conducted in Iraq is similar in many instances to the work done by the Army in America during westward expansion and during occupation duty in Germany. This work is especially similar in that the Army found itself protecting civilians from hostile inhabitants and supply bases through which people could travel on their way to their homes.

The humanitarian work in Iraq centered around the construction of transient camps. A total of seven transient camps were surveyed with two complete camps built, one camp with roads and latrines installed, two camps with roads constructed and two camps only surveyed.²⁸ The camps consisted of over 9,000 meters of road systems, semi-permanent water systems, tents, and latrines. The Army also provided security and lighting for a community support center. The Army further constructed two food warehouses and permanent underground water systems connecting existing wells to water tanks. In conjunction with establishing the water system for the camps JTF-B installed generators and pumps on four wells in the Zakho valley to supply water not only to the camps but also to residents of nearby towns.²⁹

A large subset of the aid provided to the Kurds involved transportation. The Army provided transportation of everything from displaced civilians to water including food, fuel, medicine, clothing, and material for construction work. In addition to providing transportation, the JTF constructed and supported transient way stations for the Kurds moving from the camps to their homes.³⁰

U.S. Army forces in Iraq also provided a great deal of medical aid to the displaced civilians. The JTF ran medical facilities to provide routine medical screening and follow-up. In addition to routine medical care, the JTF inoculated over 53,000 Kurds for measles.³¹ The JTF also conducted medical evacuation of over 70 Kurds to various medical facilities for emergency treatment. ³²

The JTF forces helped to reestablish the public utilities in many towns in northern Iraq to include school functions, public utilities, security functions, and hospital functions. The JTF maintained roads, built furniture, removed unexploded ordinance, cleared minefields, cleared rubble, rebuilt runways, and drilled wells.

In all, the JTF assisted over 500,000 people in returning to their homes.³³ With the aid of the Army, the economic infrastructure of northern Iraq began to improve. With the return of the Kurds to their homes at least a modicum of relief and normality returned. Although the occupation of Germany and Operation Provide Comfort resulted from fighting a war, not all peacetime engagement type operations result from the end of a war. Operation GTMO, which provided humanitarian aid to Haitian refugees, resulted from a mass exodus of refugees after a coup in Haiti.

Cuba--Resettling Haitian Refugees

On 22 November 1991, the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command (USCINCLANT) announced the following mission statement for CINCLANT forces: Provide emergency humanitarian assistance that may be temporarily required and increased security as required for Haitian boat people at Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.³⁴ This mission gave direction to the forces deployed to Guantanamo Bay as part of JTF GTMO. The forces deployed, as of 18 December 1991, totaled 1,774. Of the 1,774 servicemen and women

involved, forty-one percent or 736 were Army personnel. The Army comprised the largest percentage of any service personnel deployed.

The mission for JTF GTMO meant that Haitian refugees fleeing the new regime in Haiti would be interdicted by Navy and Coast Guard vessels between Haiti and the U.S. The Haitians were transported to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to undergo a screening process to determine if they would be admitted to the U.S. or returned to Haiti. Military forces assigned to JTF GTMO were part of an interagency operation. Besides the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Justice (DOJ), in the form of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the Public Health Service (PHS) had major roles to play. An important side note on this is that DOD had to provide transportation to Cuba for all of the personnel, even those belonging to government agencies other than the DOD.

The success of Operation GTMO was in large measure a direct result of the participation of the armed forces. As of 12 February 1992, JTF GTMO constructed six major tent populations at two sites at Guantanamo to provide humanitarian relief. The number of Haitians living in the tent cities exceeded 10,500.³⁵ Although civilian organizations like the INS and the PHS conducted the screening of Haitians to determine their final disposition, it was up to the military personnel to render medical aid and immunizations. The military personnel constructed the camps, administered the medical care, transported the Haitians, and secured the population.

Security of the Haitians and security of permanent party personnel on Guantanamo were important considerations in the planning and execution of JTF GTMO. On at least four occasions Haitians conducted demonstrations in the camps to protest conditions. On 15 December 1991, male Haitians actually took over

Camp McCalla II. Two infantry companies were flown in to handle the take over and control was reestablished on 17 December 1991.³⁶

In addition to the construction and security of the camps and the medical assistance, the JTF GTMO personnel began planning for long-term occupation of the camps by Haitian refugees. This planning included vocational training for the Haitians as well as self-government of the camps. Further, the military maintained ongoing programs of recreation and religious activities for the Haitians.

A key consideration in both the Provide Comfort and JTF GTMO operations was that while there was civilian agency participation, the military had the lead on each. As discussed above, the military is uniquely qualified to provide the timely assistance required in situations like the Kurdish and Haitian problems. The military is unique in its organization, personnel, and equipment to perform the many peacetime engagement situations that arise around the world. No other organization in America is as qualified and capable as the military to react, plan, and execute peacetime engagement operations.

Because of its qualifications and history in peacetime engagement activities, there may be a tendency by some to involve the Army in every such operation or change the focus of the Army from warfighting to peacetime engagement. Therefore, clearly delineated criteria to determine the feasibility or propriety of Army involvement in peacetime engagement operations is important for military and civilian planners.

Defining a Proper Role

The Army is a versatile organization with diverse equipment and capabilities to fulfill many missions. Additionally, the Army has a focus on mission accomplishment regardless of obstacles encountered, and a mindset of

obeying the orders of those in charge. With these attributes in mind, it will be helpful to Army planners to have some criteria by which to determine which peacetime engagement missions are proper for the Army. This criteria would also assist in planning effective roles for the Army. This paper recommends seven criterion with which to gage the propriety of Army participation in peacetime engagement activities. The seven criterion are:

- 1. The President directs participation (can occur through designated representatives--Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, Secretary of the Army, Ambassadors, The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, etc.)**
- 2. The role of the Army is constitutionally valid**
- 3. The role is legislatively valid**
- 4. The role does not detract from the Army's warfighting focus**
- 5. The capability to perform the role exists in the Army structure**
- 6. Army participation presents a reasonable chance for a long term solution**
- 7. The use of Army forces is consistent with the socio-political environment in the target country or region**

The Army's leadership must acknowledge up front that in some instances the criteria for employment of Army forces in peacetime engagement activities may be disregarded by civilian authorities. Army leadership may have minimal input in the decision to employ Army forces, particularly in the case of criteria #6 and #7. If Army forces are directed to participate in peacetime engagement activities in circumstances that do not meet the criteria above, the Army is still obligated to perform them, although there are at least two advantages to identifying criteria for employment in advance. First, decision makers can be

informed about the criteria to ensure that the Army's participation is legal and makes the best use of its capabilities. Second, when employment is directed in spite of the criteria, planners can inform decision makers of the risks associated with the decision. Further, with these risks identified early in the planning process, action can be taken to structure the employment of forces to account or compensate for them.

The President must direct participation by the armed forces, at least in the broadest sense of the term. Each and every operation need not have the President's specific seal of approval, but the overall participation of armed forces must be approved by the President. This approval insures the continuing subordination of the military to civilian control. Further, since peacetime engagement is more than a military process, it is one involving all elements of national power, the President must initiate the process to coordinate all elements of power including the military. This means that almost all peacetime engagement operations will be interagency operations, thus complicating command and control procedures. The Commanders in Chief (CINC) of the unified commands all work for the President, through the Secretary of Defense with communication through the JCS. Therefore, it is easy for the President to direct and control not only peacetime engagement operations in a specific country but also across a broad region, and not only in the Department of Defense but across the boundaries of all U.S. agencies. The President must not only direct that the Army participate, he should also specify the command and control relationships of all the agencies involved.

The role of the military must be Constitutionally valid. The Constitution does not restrict the use of armed forces in very many areas but it does in a few important to the use of forces in peacetime engagement. Because

most of the combat service support forces reside in the reserve component, the "calling forth of the militia to execute the laws of the Union" ³⁷ clause in the Constitution is a key component of making reserve forces available for service in routine peacetime engagement operations. Further, the clause of the Constitution appointing the President as "the commander in chief of the Army and of the militia of the several States when called into the actual service of the United States" ³⁸ is important to the assignment of missions to all federal or federalized troops. The Constitution contains key provisions for employing forces in peacetime engagement operations, but it is sufficiently vague to allow for a wide variety of uses. The Constitution provides the Congress with the authority "to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces" ³⁹ and this is the area of most import to the use of forces in peacetime engagement operations. The Constitution provides the basis for the employment of the armed forces, yet has been altered and more clearly defined by subsequent legislation. Therefore, Army planners need to be aware of legislative restrictions on their use.

The Army's role in peacetime engagement must be legislatively valid. The Congress makes the rules for the government and regulation of the Army. Not only are the forces regulated and governed by Congress, certain funds that will be used in peacetime engagement are appropriated, allocated, and governed by the Congress. Therefore, the funds and forces used in peacetime engagement operations are subject to regulation and these regulations must be abided by when committing forces. Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 1385, the Posse Comitatus Act, restricts the use of Army forces for civilian law enforcement operations. Title 10, U.S. Code, Sections 371-378 further clarify some of the conditions that must be adhered to when Army forces and equipment are used to assist civil authorities. These regulations need to be

understood before committing forces in order to insure that they will not prevent forces from being effective in the peacetime engagement mission. Further, the forces involved must understand the regulations to insure that during the performance of a mission they do not inadvertently exceed or break the regulations or law. Legislation is a living process, therefore Army planners need to study and stay abreast of current legislation on the use of Army forces to support peacetime engagement operations. It is important for U.S. forces involved in peacetime engagement operations to maintain a close liaison with their JAG support to help ensure full understanding of the applicable legislation.

U.S. legislation may not be the only legal concern of forces involved in peacetime engagement activities. It is possible that U.S. forces will be subject to U.S., international, and the host nation laws, simultaneously. This aspect of peacetime engagement activities argues further for a very close relationship between the commander and JAG.

The role of the Army in peacetime engagement operations must not detract from the Army's warfighting focus. Peacetime engagement is an important mission and a reasonable deterrent to conflict, however, deterrence has failed in the past and may fail in the future. FM 100-1, The Army, states that "the wartime objectives of land forces are to defeat the enemy's forces, to seize, occupy and defend land area, and assist in destroying the enemy's will to resist."⁴⁰ Army regulations (AR 500-51) and Title 10 of the U.S. Code both state that assistance to civilian law enforcement agencies must not adversely effect military preparedness.⁴¹ The Army must be prepared to perform its primary mission of winning in combat.

To the extent possible peacetime engagement functions should reflect a mission that an Army unit would likely be called on to perform in combat. This may be impossible in some instances from a large unit perspective, but in every

case commanders at all levels should strive to relate what they are required to do in a peacetime engagement operation to one of their mission essential task list (METL) tasks. For example, an engineer operating a bulldozer in Honduras is performing one of his individual tasks. An engineer company or battalion building a road in Honduras is performing one of its METL tasks. An engineer dumptruck providing transport for food is probably not performing a METL related task. This mission would be better suited for a transportation unit.

The idea of not detracting from the Army's primary mission should be reflected in two areas: in structure (discussed in the next criteria) and in assignment. Army forces should not be assigned to peacetime engagement operations on such a broad front that redeploying them for a war or contingency would be difficult or present an unnecessary signature.

The capability to perform the role exists in the Army structure today. In the realistic world of budget cuts and force constraints, some people or institutions may try to expand the Army structure by using peacetime engagement as the selling tool. Army officers must not allow this to happen. Peacetime engagement operations are not a reason to expand or change the role of the Army. Nor are they a reason to buy new equipment that will not function in a way that supports the Army's primary mission of fighting and winning the ground war. Army structure should not change to incorporate more forces strictly for peacetime engagement missions and Army structure should never allow the formation of units whose sole missions are in the peacetime engagement arena. Finally, the mission of peacetime engagement must never become the primary mission for the Army.

Army participation should present a reasonable chance for a long term solution to the problem against which it is employed. This means that the Army's participation should be part of a long term plan for a

country or a region. This further suggests that not just the military element of power is employed in each country, but that all elements of power are used. Further, this means that Army forces could be part of an interagency plan (perhaps a campaign plan) and in some instances will be subordinate to agencies other than the DOD or DOS. The Army and policymakers should avoid sending small, relatively meaningless, deployments to many different countries just to have Americans in the host country. Each deployment of Army units should be an integral part of an overall strategy for each country or region.

Having stated the reasons for the criteria, it is still important to remember that if civilian authorities issue legal orders for Army participation where the criteria are not met, the Army must and will obey.

Finally, the use of Army forces should be consistent with the socio-political environment in the host country or region. Some consideration should be given early to the view the host country population has of its uniformed services or those of another nation. It may be self-defeating to send Army forces to a country to perform peacetime engagement missions where the population is used to a repressive government backed by an abusive military. The chance that skill transfer can take place in this situation is minimal. It takes willing minds to learn, and civilian populations used to an abusive military may be unwilling or mentally incapable of learning from a uniformed service because they identify any uniform with their own abusive military. In a lot of minds, uniforms are uniforms no matter who is wearing them. The stigma of military dress can seriously detract from the soldier's ability to perform his mission in some areas. The answer to this problem is not necessarily to send soldiers in civilian clothes, but to set the conditions for the soldiers to still be successful in this environment. If an oppressive military is part of the underlying causes of instability in a region or country, perhaps the American Army should set the

example for both the host country civilian population and the host nation armed forces. In some cases it may be better to bring citizens of the host country to America for training, similar to the School of the Americas at Ft. Benning, Georgia.

With these criteria in mind, Army planners can determine the propriety of employing Army forces in peacetime engagement operations. They can also identify possible weaknesses and risks in the employment of Army forces and make branches to their plan to account for the weaknesses or risks. It is also helpful to identify implications of Army involvement in peacetime engagement operations or the decision not to employ Army forces.

Implications

There are many implications involved in peacetime engagement operations conducted by the Army. The interagency nature of peacetime engagement makes for a fine line between who is most affected by the implications and who needs to be aware of them. Some of the following implications are not in the Army's purview to solve, but they are offered as possible areas for further thought and study outside the scope of this paper.

The first implication involves command and control and planning of peacetime engagement operations. At present there are many agencies or departments that can have command of a peacetime engagement operation. The Army, through the Department of Defense, may have the lead in one operation, the Department of State in another, and the Department of Transportation or Justice in another. Each department operates according its own standard operating procedures and planning systems. In some cases, command of an operation can change at some point during planning or execution. In all cases it would be helpful to have a standardized planning and orders process across

interagency and interdepartmental lines. The agreement would be directed by the President and applicable to all peacetime engagement operations. We have such standardized agreements with our allies in NATO, and we should be able to make the same agreements within our own government.

In conjunction with the standard planning and orders process for peacetime engagement operations, it would be helpful to try to standardize the chain of command as much as possible between the Department of Defense and the Department of State. What I am recommending is that the Department of State identify a person such as an Undersecretary of State for a specific region similar to the CINC's in the Unified Commands. The Department of State currently has this position, however, the person has little or no command authority in his region. Further, the Undersecretary's place of duty is in Washington, D.C.; perhaps a better place of duty would be in his region, somewhere close to the CINC. The Undersecretary would be responsible for manning, training, and equipping the Ambassadors in a specific region to be aligned with the Unified Commands. In this manner the CINC and the Undersecretary could coordinate the efforts of peacetime engagement operations throughout a region. Right now each Ambassador in each country has his own agenda for things he wants done, and the Ambassador only directs those forces or personnel in his country. An Undersecretary responsible for an entire region with similar authority to the CINC could allow closer cooperation between the DOS and the DOD in peacetime engagement operations.

Another implication of command and control in peacetime engagement operations has to do with the planning of the operation. The operation has to have identified objectives that allow planners to identify a beginning and an end to the operation. This is necessary because we do not have enough forces to do everything at once. Furthermore, a plan will help commanders and soldiers

maintain the objective foremost in mind. The means to gaining the purpose of peacetime engagement is passing on the responsibility for continued development to the host country. A plan similar to a campaign plan would lay out a timeline for obtaining objectives and measurements for knowing when the objectives are met.

An additional benefit to a campaign plan would be the ability of planners to prioritize the peacetime engagement projects. The limitations of the force structure and budget require that planners prioritize and order projects to accomplish. A principle for planners to follow is that peacetime engagement projects should be related to the possibility of future operations in a region, if possible. For instance, projects such as port facilities, airfields, communications networks, and roads may be completed first if these things enhance military operations that may occur in the area. This may be a sensitive subject to some host nations and may not need to be spelled out in detail in any plan, but it should be a principle by which to plan.

The final implication of peacetime engagement involves the possibility of not using the Army in the future. If peacetime engagement is an important security concept and the Army's equipment, training, and personnel make it a good force for peacetime engagement operations, but the Army may not be available due to its other missions, there may be another solution. Perhaps the government needs to man, train, and equip a force strictly for peacetime engagement operations without a combat mission. The Department of State could own this force and be responsible for planning and execution of all peacetime engagement activities. This force would be an expansion of an already existing program that the DOS maintains for crisis response. With the selective early retirement boards and the possibility of a reduction in force, there is a pool of qualified and experienced personnel available for this force. This force, if

practical, is still many years off, and so for the short term the Army will remain the probable service of choice for future peacetime engagement operations.

Conclusion

The Army has a definite part to play in peacetime engagement. In fact, the Army is currently the only organization capable of performing some of the activities required. Further, there are some peacetime engagement activities that other organizations can do, but not as well as the Army. The Army's manpower, equipment and experience make it the best organization now to perform most peacetime engagement activities.

The Army's manpower assets, always on call, with a dedication to mission accomplishment and a tradition of operating in austere environments makes it a logical choice for peacetime engagement operations. The Army's personnel readiness requirements for combat operations make Army personnel almost always prepared to deploy on short notice. This ability is particularly adaptable to emergency peacetime engagement operations such as humanitarian aid following natural or manmade disasters.

The Army's equipment assets are also well-suited to peacetime engagement operations. The Army, by virtue of the necessity to prepare for immediate combat, maintains its equipment in mission capable status at all times. The Army also sustains its own parts supply system and maintenance personnel. Not only is the equipment well-maintained, it is well-suited to peacetime engagement activities. Construction equipment, transportation equipment, signal equipment, power generation equipment, etc. are all necessary to command and control operations and to perform the actual work.

The Army's experience base makes it particularly adaptable to peacetime engagement. The environment within which the Army trains for combat prepares its personnel for work in austere environments, over long hours, and in

expedient methods of accomplishing missions. The Army also has an experienced command and control process that lends itself well to planning and controlling forces involved in diverse operations over large distances. All of these experiences translate directly to the ability to perform peacetime engagement operations around the world.

The experiences gained in Army training prepare soldiers to easily adapt to peacetime engagement operations-- a role supported by a rich heritage of such service. As discussed previously in this monograph, the Army, from its inception, has been involved in peacetime engagement operations both at home and abroad. This tradition and experience makes the Army a logical choice for peacetime engagement operations.

The Army has at least two key reasons to remain involved in conducting peacetime engagement operations. One is to help deter war and the other is the requirement to perform peacetime engagement operations in post-conflict activity.

As stated early in this monograph, maintaining regional stability and deterring war are part of the purpose of peacetime engagement. The Army has a vital interest in deterring war since it will be the organization that will fight the war should one break out. For this reason the Army will be very interested in the way peacetime engagement is performed in host nations. The Army should take advantage of the ability to prioritize projects in host nations during peacetime engagement operations in order to insure that priority is given to projects which will assist in combat operations should war break out. The Army should also take advantage of intelligence gathering made possible by peacetime engagement operations. Finally, the Army should take advantage of the opportunity to conduct personal reconnaissance and unit acclimatization in an

area of possible combat operations to foster goodwill with host nation forces and facilitate interoperability in future combat operations should they be required.

As history has shown, after conflict comes a time of restoration; this is called post-conflict activity. After WW II restoration translated to occupation duty, after Desert Storm it translated to Operation Provide Comfort. Post-conflict activity is an important phase in trying to insure hostilities do not break out again. The Army is the force on or nearest to the ground for this process of resolution. Therefore, the Army is the force most readily available for these operations. Operations taking place in this post-conflict period are the same activities, in many instances, as peacetime engagement operations. There is only a very subtle difference between the post-conflict activities and peacetime engagement operations. The difference is mainly in the attitude of the population, both civilian and Army, as the tension from conflict recedes. During this period the Army is the organization best suited to conduct operations to insure as smooth a transition as possible from war, through post-conflict activity, back to peace.

As appealing and logical as the choice of the Army for peacetime engagement operations is, there are some dangers to the choice. The Army's mission is to win the land war. In peacetime the mission is to stay prepared to win the land war. Nothing must be allowed to detract from the ability of the Army to perform these two missions. If the Army becomes involved in so many peacetime engagement operations that the focus shifts from winning the land war to building roads and drilling wells, the security of the nation will be in jeopardy.

The shift in focus from winning in combat to peacetime engagement seems an easy pitfall to avoid. This would be true if the shift were sudden and obvious. However, shifts in focus can occur subtly over a period of time. Units are sent on deployment for just a little longer each time, the time to train up for an

operation is extended, and the time to recover from the operation is increased until most of the unit training time is spent on peacetime engagement activities.

This type of subtle change is not restricted to training time only, it can also effect equipment and money. In the case of equipment the change involves a little more work but still can be subtle enough to avoid notice until it is too late. For example, a unit involved in peacetime engagement operations discovers it can perform the mission considerably better or easier if it deployed with an additional four trucks. Initially, the trucks are borrowed from other units for the deployment and then eventually the peacetime engagement mission is used to justify procuring additional trucks on a permanent basis. On the other hand, as part of the task organization for deployment and due to airlift restrictions a unit takes only those pieces of equipment necessary for the mission. A unit could eventually lose the skill in using certain pieces of equipment due to their always being left behind on peacetime engagement operations.

In addition to time and equipment, the same rationale can be applied to money. A unit deployed on peacetime engagement operations discovers that they can do the mission better for a little more of their mission dollars. Before long a large portion of the unit budget is spent on peacetime engagement operations.

The cumulative effect of a subtle shift in focus from winning in combat to peacetime engagement is that units may spend time and money and procure equipment not based on wartime missions but on peacetime engagement. The impact could be a reduced readiness to fight. With reduced readiness comes the possibility of failure in war. This is a possibility the Army must not allow to occur.

The final pitfall to avoid is illegality. As the appeal of the Army as a solution to peacetime engagement operations grows, the temptation to short-cut or work around legislation could grow. The U.S. government is a complex system

of checks and balances not only between the departments and branches of the federal government, but also between the federal and state governments. These checks and balances are in place to avoid historic problems between federal and state governments, the Army and the people. To tamper with, circumvent, or disregard the regulations governing the employment of the Army would be a very dangerous precedent and run against the foundation of the armed forces. This pitfall must also be avoided at all costs.

The seven criteria recommended in this monograph will aid operational planners in determining if a peacetime engagement operation is proper for the Army and if the timing, based on other possible missions, is appropriate. The criteria for a proper role will also aid the operational planner in identifying possible risks or special considerations that need to be resolved or addressed in the peacetime engagement plan. If the seven criteria are not met, the Army should not be the force deployed on the peacetime engagement operation. Having said this, it is always possible that the Army will be directed by legal authority to perform an operation that does not meet the seven criteria. Except for the legal issues, the Army will obey and conduct the mission. In this case, the criteria will aid the operational planner in setting the conditions for success of the force by identifying potential pitfalls in the operation or weaknesses of the force that can be addressed and corrected prior to deployment.

In conclusion, the Army is a good choice, a logical choice, and currently the only choice for a variety of peacetime engagement operations. It is incumbent on the Army and civilian authorities to weigh the gains of employing Army forces for peacetime engagement against the possible pitfalls. This paper offers seven criteria as the starting point for the discussion and planning to determine the suitability of Army forces for particular missions.

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